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ABSTRACT
Historically, commercial use of university research has been viewed in terms of spillovers.
Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in technology transfer through licensing as universities
aftempt to appropriate the returns from faculty research. This change has prompted concerns
regarding the source of this growth -specifically,whether it suggests a change in the nature of
university research. We develop an intermediate input model to examine the extent to which the
growth in licensing is due to the productivity observable inputs or driven by a change in the
propensity of faculty and administrators to engage in commercializing university research. We
model licensing as a three stage process, each involving multiple inputs. Nonparametric
programming techniques are applied to survey data from 65universitiesto calculate total factor
productivity (TFP) growth in each state. To examine the sources of TFP growth, the productivity
analysis is augmented by survey evidence from business who license-in university inventions.
Results suggest that increased licensing is due primarily to an increased willingness of faculty and
administrators to license and increased business reliance on external R&D rather than a shift in
faculty research.
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According to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) surveys, li-
censing activity in U.S. research universities has increased dramatically in the 1990s. For
the 65 universities responding to the survey in each of the years 1994-97, yearly invention
disclosures increased 8% per year. Over the same period, new patent applications and li-
censes and options executed annually grew by 20.4% and 9.6%, respectively. In 1997 alone
the 132 universities responding to the survey reported a total of 9051 disclosures, 3644 new
patent applications and 2707 licenses and options executed.
This growth in the so-called "commercial outputs" of academic research has received
considerable attention both from technology managers and university administrators who
cite it as evidence of the increasing contribution of universities to the economy (e.g., AUTM
press release, 1998) and policy makers who, in contrast, question the impact of commercial
activity on the conduct and industrial impact of faculty research (Congressional Record,
1999). Unfortunately, there is little evidence to evaluate the arguments since these growth
rates alone tell nothing about the productivity of university resources devoted to technology
transfer, nor do they provide evidence on the sources of increased licensing.
In this paper, we explore the source(s) of this growth in university licensing. We focus on
the role of inputs, including intermediate inputs, in the process, and we examine the extent
to which the explosion in licensing is being driven by faculty and university administrators
becoming more entrepreneurial. In particular, is the primary source of growth simply an
increased propensity for university administrators to patent and attempt to license faculty
inventions? To what extent is growth due to an increased propensity of businesses to license
university inventions? Has the propensity of faculty to disclose inventions increased either
because they are more willing to license as well as publish their research or because their
research has shifted toward topics of more interest to industry? It is the latter element of
faculty propensity that has been the focus of policy discussions.
We model technology transfer as a three stage production process involving multiple
inputs in each stage. The three stages follow the sequence of steps typically involved in
licensing university inventions. First stage outputs are invention disclosures, which are filed
by faculty when they believe their research results have commercial potential. In addition
to faculty, first stage inputs include federal and industry research support as well as TTO
personnel.1 Disclosures are intermediate inputs to a second stage in which the TTO applies
for patents on those disclosures they believe can be patented and licensed. Inputs for this
stage also include a measure of faculty quality to capture patent potential. In turn, patent
applications and disclosures are used along with other licensing inputs in a third stage to
produce license and option agreements.
'TTO personnel are university employees responsible for encouraging andaidingfaculty in disclosing
and for executing licenses agreeements with industry.2
We provide two types of evidence on the sources of growth. The first is a productivity
analysis using AUTM survey data for 65 U.s. universities for 1994-1997 which provides
evidence on the extent to which growth in each stage is a direct result of increases in inputs
devoted to technology transfer. The second is based on a survey of businesses who licensed
university inventions over the period 1993-97. These survey data, in conjunction with our
productivity results, allow us to consider the extent to which licensing has grown because
of changes in the propensity of faculty and administrators to engage in commercial activity
and/or changes in business behavior toward universities.
In the productivity analysis, we use nonparametric programming techniques developed
by Fare et al (1994) to examine productivity growth. For each of the three stages, we
construct a best practice frontier that represents the maximum feasible stage output given
available inputs and existing attitudes or knowledge. This approach allows us to identify
both frontier performance and operation within the frontier. Thus, total factor productivity
(TFP) growth can be decomposed into two components: one reflecting a frontier shift and
another showing movement toward (catching up) or away from the frontier. Given the
dramatic growth of licensing activity and reorganization of a number of TTOs during the
early nineties, both components of growth are likely to be important.2
For the 65 universities in our sample, we find TFP growth rates for disclosures and patent
applications that are roughly 6% lower than the nominal growth rates noted above, and,
for licenses executed, TFP growth is negative. While this implies that much of the growth
in university commercial activity stems from input growth, it also suggests that changed
propensities are an important element of growth. Of particular note is the negative TFP
growth in licenses which, coupled with increased disclosures and patent applications, can
be interpreted as evidence of universities delving more "deeply" into the available pool of
commercializable inventions. To the extent that universities are attempting to increase
the number of inventions licensed, without a concurrent shift in the underlying distribu-
tion of discoveries with commercial potential, we would expect the marginal inventions to
have less commercial appeal. Our productivity analysis therefore suggests that universities
are licensing less important inventions. This result is particularly interesting in light of
Henderson, Jaffe, Trajtenberg's (1998) evidence from an earlier period (1965-1988) that
as university patenting increased, the importance (as measured by citations) of university
patents declined.
To examine why propensities to engage in university/firm licensing have changed —that
is, to examine the possible sources of TFP growth— we draw on the results of our business
survey as well as the productivity analysis. For the first stage, our interest is in whether the
growth in disclosures (net of inputs) is due to a reorientation of faculty research towards
2Thfrty five percent of the TTOs responding to our earlier university survey were reorganized during
the nineties (Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby 2000).3
the needs of industry and away from basic research, or whether the growth is due to a
greater willingness on the part of faculty to disclose as well as publish the results of their
research. For the second stage, we focus on whether productivity growth stems from a
greater receptivity of university administrations to industry contracts. In the final stage,
our major interest is the extent to which growth stems from changes in industry R&D3 or
from factors leading to the growth in disclosures and patent applications.
The survey supports the view that industry reliance on university inventions increased
during this period, and, in indicating the reasons, respondents weighted changes in their
own R&D more heavily than a change in faculty research toward topics of greater interest
to industry. Together with the productivity results, this suggests that the primary reason
for increased invention disclosures may indeed be an increased propensity for faculty to
disclose rather than a change in research focus. The industry survey also supports an
increased receptivity of universities to industry contracts. This result, together with the
fact that these businesses increased their contractual agreements with universities, reinforces
our interpretation of our stage three productivity results that negative TFP growth most
likely reflects university efforts to patent and license inventions with marginal commercial
potential.
Finally, we find that much of the growth in TFP for the disclosure and patent stages
comes from catching up by universities which were operating within the frontier. Only for
the patent stage do we find both a shift in best practice and catching up. Further, we find
that growth patterns differ according to public/private status and whether a university has
a medical school.
These results contribute to the growing literature on the industrial impact of academic
research. The bulk of this literature has focused either on the role of patents and publications
in the transfer process (see Adams 1990, Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 1998, and Jaffe,
Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993) or on consulting, sponsored research or institutional ties
(see Cohen et.al 1998, Mansfield 1995, and Zucker et.al 1994 and 1998). While several recent
papers provide evidence on the nature of university licensing (e.g., Jensen and Thursby
1999, Mowery et.al 1999, Mowery and Ziedonis 1999, Siegel, Waldman, and Link 1999, and
Thursby and Kemp 1999), none of them provides a structure that allows analysis of the
sources of growth.
One benefit from our structure is that we can comment on the growing policy debates
on the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 which gave universities the right to license inventions from
federally funded research. Much of the concern of those who question the Act's impact
comes from fears that financial returns to licensing would divert faculty from basic to applied
research. In their study of licensing activities at Columbia, Stanford, and the University
of California System, Mowery et.al (1998) and Mowery and Ziedonis (1999) point out that
explanation follows from discussions with industry licensing executives.4
faculty at these universities had a long history of applied research well before the Bayh-
Dole Act. Since neither their work nor ours examines the pattern of faculty research, we
cannot reject the notion that faculty research has shifted. However, the intermediate input
structure of our productivity analysis, combined with our industry survey, allows us to show
that changes in the direction of faculty research appear relatively less important than other
factors, such as the dramatic increase in the propensity of administrators to patent and
license faculty inventions. This was, in fact, an intended effect of the Bayh-Dole Act.
2. University Technology Transfer: A Multi-Stage Process
In this section, we provide background information on the licensing process and present
our multi-stage model. The programming approach we adopt for the productivity analysis
is described in Section 3, and the results are given in Section 4. The business survey is
discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2.1. Disclosures
The licensing process begins with a faculty member reporting a discovery that he or she
believes has commercial potential. This report, or disclosure, involves faculty providing the
TTO with information on the invention and inventors, funding sources, potential licensees,
as well as barriers to patent potential (such as prior publication).
It is important to realize that invention disclosures represent a subset of university
research with commercial potential. The TTO personnel we interviewed in an earlier study
of university licensing in U.S. universities indicated that they believe less than half of the
faculty inventions with commercial potential are disclosed to their office (Jensen, Thursby,
and Thursby 2000). In some cases faculty may not realize the commercial potential of their
ideas, but often they do not disclose inventions because they are unwilling to risk delaying
publication in the patent and license process. Half of the firms in our industry survey noted
that they include delay of publication clauses in at least 90% of their university contracts
(Thursby and Thursby 1999). The average delay is nearly 4 months, and some firms require
as much as a year's delay.
Faculty who specialize in basic research may not disclose because they are unwilling to
spend time on the applied research and development that is often needed for businesses
to be interested in licensing university inventions.4 Respondents to our TTO and industry
surveys noted that 88% and 84%, respectively, of licensed university inventions require
further development and that 45% and 44%, respectively, of licensed inventions are no more
than a "proof of concept" at the time of license. The firms noted that for such inventions,
faculty cooperate in further development more than 40% of the time. Finally, some faculty
Mansfield (1995) and Zucker et. al. (1994) regarding faculty who are successful in both applied and
basic research.5
may refuse to disclose for "philosophical" reasons related to their notions of the proper role
of academic scientists and engineers. Thus, for a variety of reasons, the TTO personnel we
interviewed indicated that one of their major challenges is obtaining faculty disclosures.
We model invention disclosures for university u (DISCU) as a function of observable and
unobservable inputs. Observable inputs are faculty size, research funds, and the number
of full time equivalent personnel in the TTO (TTOFTEU). Since disclosures are generally
based on research that has been ongoing for some time, we use the average over the preceding
three years of the amounts of federal research support (LACFEDU) and industry sponsored
research (LACINDU). For faculty size, we use the number of faculty in each of the major
program areas biological sciences, engineering and physical sciences (TOTFAC123). By
not aggregating faculty across fields, we attempt to capture the fact that research methods
and market interest in inventions can differ markedly across the sciences and engineering.5
The unobservable inputs are the faculty's propensity to disclose (PROP) and the prob-
ability of invention discovery (11). Thus,
DISCU =f1(TTOFTEU,LACFEDU ,LACIND,TOTFAC123;PROP, III).(2.1)
The propensity to disclose reflects both the direction of faculty research and faculty willing-
ness to disclose, and it can be influenced by the policies and practices of university central
administrations as well as the perceived potential for monetary gain. lii represents the
probability of discovery, conditional on the level of research effort (e.g., research support
and faculty size) and split of effort between basic or applied research. In terms of an indi-
vidual invention, 11 represents the "black box" probability that a given amount of research
effort will result in an invention, which we assume is independent of the university. Given
the short time frame of our analysis (4 years), it is unlikely that 11 has changed significantly,
if at all.
2.2.Patents
Oncean invention is disclosed, the TTO evaluates patent and commercial potential.
From our earlier survey, it is clear that many TTOs apply for patents only when they
expect to find licensees easily. Mowery and Ziedonis (1999) note that 6 years after disclosure
slightly more than 20% of disclosures at Stanford and the University of California system
have patents. Of course, many inventions, such as copyrightable software and reagent
materials, are not eligible for patent protection.
We consider new patent applications (PATENTSU) by university u, rather than patents
awarded, as our measure of second stage output, in part because of substantial lags between
application and issue, but also because patent applications are a better measure of a uni-
versity's interest in commercialization than are patents awarded. Observable inputs to the
5As discussed in Thursby aiid Kemp (1999), engineering is more applied than the other fields and it is
also said that biological sciences have more of a seller's market than the other two.6
patent stage are the number of disclosures, number of personnel in the TTO and a measure
of faculty quality. The latter is included to adjust for possible differences in commercial
quality and novelty of disclosures across universities. Like our measure of faculty size, the
quality measure is by major program field (QUAL123). Patent applications are also a
function of an unobservable propensity to patent (PROP). Since the decision to apply for
a patent (which is ultimately owned by the university) is largely made by TTO personnel,
the propensity to patent is indicative of the commercial aggressiveness of the university
central administration.6 Thus, university u's second stage production is modeled as
PATENTSU =f2(DISCu,TTOFTEU ,QUAL1,2,3;PROP). (2.2)
Note that faculty interests in commercialization enter through the observable DISCU.
2.3. License Agreements
License and option agreements executed by university u (LCEX ECU) are modeled as
a function of the numbers of disclosures and patent applications as well as the size of the
TTO office. We include both disclosures and patent applications because some licenses
are executed without patent protection and the fact that a patent application is made
may well provide information about the perceived quality of patentable disclosures. As
was the case with patent applications we include faculty quality in an attempt to adjust for
possible differences in commercial quality and novelty of disclosures and patent applications
across universities, and hence likelihood of finding a licensee. Unobservable inputs are the
university's propensity to license inventions (PROP) as well as the distribution of industry
interest in university inventions, 113. Our model of licenses and options executed is
LCEXEC =f3(DISCu,PATENTSU ,TTOFTE,QUAL1,2,3;PROP, 113).(2.3)
PROP reflects the TTO's ability and knowledge as well as their aggressiveness in finding
potential licensees. 113 represents market conditions that are independent of the other
inputs. In terms of a single invention, it is the probability of finding a match in the market
conditional on invention characteristics. Since both PROP and 113 could have changed
during our sample period (and our business survey indicates a change in 113), we are not
able to identify their separate effects. Note that faculty and administration propensities
enter through DiSC and PATENTSU.
An alternative approach to modeling the last stage would be to include license revenue
and/or sponsored research associated with licenses as outputs. This would allow us to
analyze TFP in terms of the returns to licensing, and the programming techniques we employ
E3jisoften the decision of the TTO as to whether a patent is applied for. In our survey of TTOs we
found that the TTO believes it closely reflects the interests of their central administration (See the ana'ysis
in Jensen and Thursby, 1999)).7
are well suited for examining multiple outputs. There are, however, several problems with
taking this approach. While AUTM collects information on royalty income and sponsored
research associated with licenses, royalty income in any given year comes, not only from
current licenses, but also from licenses executed in previous years. In many cases, the
licenses executed may have been ten or more years prior. It is also not clear how systematic
the relation between royalty income and license inputs is since the distribution of royalty
revenue is highly skewed. In our earlier survey, we found that on average 76% of the license
revenue reported by universities is attributable to their top five inventions. Sponsored
research associated with licenses is clearly a function of licenses and inputs within the same
year. The problem with using this as a measure of output is that we know TTO personnel
often trade off royalties and sponsored research in their negotiations. As discussed in Section
4.2, we calculate TFP for sponsored research, but we believe licenses executed is a more
reliable measure of output.
3. A Frontier Analysis of Total Factor Productivity
We examine productivity in each of the three stages using an approach developed by
Fare et al. (1994). The approach is based on data envelopment analysis (DEA) which is a
non-parametric linear programming approach to comparing inputs and outputs. For each
of the three stages and for each of the universities, DEA produces a yearly efficiency rating
or score by first determining the set of universities which exhibit "best practice" for the
stage under consideration. These universities are said to form the production frontier that
relates inputs and outputs. All other universities are then compared to the subset of best
practice universities that they most resemble in terms of inputs and outputs. Thus, for each
stage and for each university and year, DEA determines whether the university lies on the
frontier (exhibits best practice) or, if not, how "far" from the frontier it lies.
It is important to note that the programming approach is not statistically based and
therefore does not allow for statistical tests of hypotheses.7 Its advantage is that it imposes
very little structure on the problem. DEA was developed to examine technical efficiency
of not-for-profit institutions that provide (possibly) multiple outputs (or services) using
multiple inputs where price data are either unavailable or distorted. The only data required
are input and output quantities, and no assumptions are made on functional form. No
restrictions are placed on institutional objectives. This is particularly important for our
case since universities have multiple objectives in their technology transfer. In our earlier
university survey, we found that many TTOs view themselves as balancing a variety of
objectives ranging from attracting industry sponsored research for faculty to maximizing
7There hs been some recent work on distribution theory with regards to DEA output, but that work is
nascent (see the discussion in Grosskopf (1996)). A problem we face here is that the efficiency scores (and,
hence, TFP growth rates) are not independent so that standard statistica' tests are inappropriate.8
license income for their central administration. Others, particularly public university TTOs,
view the public use of university technology within their state as one of their objectives.
The idea behind the best-practice frontier is most easily seen in the case of a single
input and single output. Suppose university u produces output yU from input XUthenany
other university jwithinput =XUshould be able to produce at least yU; otherwise it is
inefficient. If jproducesmore than yU when using the same input level as u, then university
u is inefficient. Similarly, if university jproducesy3 =yU,then it should use no more than
XU or it is inefficient. If jusesless than XU, then u is inefficient. Best practice performance
for a university in any stage and year simply means that no other university is doing better
in that stage and year given their inputs and outputs.
In our case, each stage has a single output but multiple inputs so that DEA involves the
maximization of the ratio of a single output to a linear combination of inputs. Essentially,
in DEA each university in each stage is compared to all other universities in the same stage
to determine if some combination of other universities has a larger ratio of output to a
linear combination of inputs. If no combination of universities has a larger ratio, then the
university under examination is said to be efficient and it lies on the best practice frontier.
Otherwise, the university is said to be inefficient. An efficiency score for a university is
the fraction of potential output produced by the university; for example, a score of 0.6
implies that, based on the performance of comparable universities on the frontier, the
university is producing 60% of what it could be producing. A precise statement of the
linear programming problem is found in Appendix A.
Once we have established the best practice frontier for each year for some stage and the
position of each university vis-a-vis that frontier, we can then measure TFP changes from
year to year for each university. The measure of TFP growth is the geometric mean of two
Malmquist indexes, one of which is based on the best practice frontier in period t and the
other based on the frontier in t + 1.8
TFPgrowth can be decomposed into two components. One is the component of produc-
tivity change that stems from movement toward or away from frontiers in successive years;
it is growth due to either catching up or lagging of universities not on the frontier in at least
one period. The other is the component of productivity change that is due to frontier shifts
between successive years. This effect is said to represent technical change. This notion of
technical change is quite general and simply represents changes in output that cannot be
attributed to a change in input usage or to a change in relative efficiency. Readers inter-
ested in a more precise statement of this measure of TFP growth and its decomposition are
directed to Appendix A.
Since the DEA analysis controls for observable inputs, both technical change and changes
in efficiency reflect changes in the unobservable inputs, hence they are useful in examining
8See Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) for the properties of the Malmquist index.9
the sources of growth. That is, the unobservable component (PROP) of DISCU reflects
both changes in faculty research and propensity to disclose; both of which can be influ-
enced by university policy. In the PATENTSU stage, faculty attitudes are captured by
the observable DISCU, and the unobservable input (PROP) reflects TTO (central ad-
ministration) attitudes. In the LCEX ECU stage, unobservable inputs reflect TTO and
market characteristics (PROP and 113). Thus, changes in TFP in Stage 1 reflect changes
in PROP, while for Stage 2 TFP changes reflect changes in PROP, and for Stage 3 TFP
changes reflect changes in PROP and/or 113.
4. Productivity Analysis
In this Section, we present both efficiency and TFP results for each of the stages defined
in Section 2 for a sample of 65 universities. The efficiency and TFP growth rates are based
on a constant returns to scale production frontier. Information on data is in Appendix B.
Before turning to results, we note that our sample of 65 universities represents a sub-
stantial fraction of all research conducted by and commercial activity of U.S. universities. In
1997, our sample accounts for almost 57% of federal research support and 61% of industry
support to all U.S. universities. The sample accounts for 68% of licenses executed, 61% of
disclosures and 67% of new patent applications by the 132 respondents to the 1997 AUTM
survey. We are confident that our sample represents more than half of the population of
research and licensing conducted at U.S. universities during the period of our observations
(1994-97).
4.1. Efficiency in Each Stage
For all three stages, we find that the majority of universities are operating within the best
practice frontier. For each stage, there are 260 observations on efficiency (65 universities for
each of four years). Only 35 observations are on the disclosure frontier, 34 are on the frontier
for patents, and 25 are on the license frontier. The 35 observations for invention disclosures
represent frontier performance for 13 universities with only four (CALTECH, Georgia Tech,
Akron and Dayton) on the frontier in all years. For patents, only 17 universities are ever
observed on the frontier, and only Washington University and Harvard are always on the
frontier. For licenses executed, 15 universities are observed on the frontier, and Harvard
is the only university always on the frontier. The average efficiency scores for Stages 1, 2,
and 3 are 0.459, 0.567, and 0.509, respectively. Thus, for example, based on observed best
practice, universities in the sample are only producing 45.9% of potential disclosures —a
number which accords well with our earlier observation that TTO directors believe that less
than half (and possibly substantially less than half) of all commercializable inventions are
being disclosed.
The efficiency scores and number of efficient universities are low for DEA studies, which10
typically find substantial bunching of scores at the efficient value of 1.0. This "lack" of
efficiency is consistent with the fact that the inputs are also used in the production of other
university outputs (i.e. basic research, teaching and service). It is also consistent with the
fact that roughly one-third of the TTOs in our sample were reorganized during the early
1990s and are expected to be less efficient because of learning by doing. Indeed, Mowery and
Ziedonis'(1999) found that the patent portfolios of universities with newly formed TTOs
in the early 1980s were not as important (relative to an industrial control sample) as the
portfolios of universities with considerable patent experience before 1980.
4.2. Total Factor Productivity
Table 1 gives the geometric means of our computed indexes of TFP growth, as well as
the output (nominal) growth in each stage. Our measures of productivity growth give a
more tempered view of growth in commercial activity than do output indexes (which are
typically reported). For example, the growth rates in disclosures and patent applications
are each about six percentage points higher than the TFP growth rates. For licenses the
difference is dramatic, with licenses executed growing at 9.6% per year and TFP falling
2.1% per year.
What immediately stands out is the large annual TFP growth rate (13.9%) in the patent
stage as compared to either disclosures (2.6%) or licenses executed (-2.1%). These growth
rates account for growth in observed inputs, so that TFP growth can be interpreted as
reflecting changes in the unobservable inputs. In particular, they suggest a modest increase
in the propensity of faculty to disclose (PROP) and a substantial increase in the propensity
for university administrators to patent (PROPfl .Whilewe cannot separate PROP into
effects from research focus or output, as opposed to the willingness to disclose, the industry
survey results reported in Section 5 suggest that research focus is, at least from industry's
perspective, not a major reason for growth in licensing. Further, the stark difference in
TFP in the first two stages is consistent with industry responses that universities are more
"receptive" to licensing.




Invention Disclosures 1.080 0.990 1.037 1.026
Patent Applications 1.204 1.078 1.057 1.139
Licenses 1.096 1.114 0.879 0.97911
What might account for the negative TFP growth in licenses? One possibility is a bias
resulting from the fact that our growth rates do not fully account for lags between disclosure
and patent application and the signing of license agreements. It is unlikely, however, that
this effect is systematic. Licenses executed today may have come from disclosures and patent
applications filed several years earlier, so that the measured productivity of disclosures and
patent applications today may be higher than actual productivity. On the other hand, the
fact that today's disclosures and patent applications may lead to licenses in later years
implies that measured productivity today may be lower than the actual. Since the growth
rates we report are geometric means over a four year period, these effects may wash out.
A second explanation is that TTOs have become more demanding in their contract
negotiations (i.e., conditional on commercial "quality" of a technology, asking price has
increased). Several industry licensing executives with whom we spoke claimed that univer-
sities were "asking for too much." We tend to discount this explanation for several reasons.
Responses to our industry survey suggest that business executives believe universities are
more receptive to contracts. 'While this does not negate higher asking prices, it casts some
doubt. We also calculated TFP growth using sponsored research as a measure of the return
or valuation of licenses executed. As we noted in Section 2.1, sponsored research tied to
licenses is flawed as a measure of current valuation since there is a trade-off between roy-
alties and sponsored research funds. If we are willing to assume that our time frame (four
years) is sufficiently short that there have been not substantial shifts in preferences for one
source of income over the other, then we can examine research funds tied to licenses as a
measure of the valuation of licenses. The TFP growth in such funds is -5.0%. Valuation,
therefore, is falling at a more rapid rate than are licenses executed. This leads us to our
next explanation.
A third, and we believe a more plausible, explanation is that the observed growth in dis-
closures and patent applications reflects universities delving more "deeply" into the available
pool of commercializable inventions. Increasing contracts and falling TFP together suggest
declining commercial appeal for the marginal disclosures and patent applications. That is,
since TFP growth is net of disclosures and new patent applications (which themselves have
been growing), the implication is that, while many more technologies are being offered and
licensed to industry, the proportion of licenses executed to those offered is falling. This pro-
ductivity result reinforces Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg's (1998) evidence of a decline
in the importance of university patents (as measured by citations) from an earlier period
(1965-88).
To look further at the relation between TFP growth in licensing and growth in disclosures
and patent applications, we regressed the log of the annual licensing TFP index on the logs
of the growth rates in disclosures and patent applications.9 TTO staff is the only other
9The regression variances are not strictly correct as they do not account for the non-independence of the12
measured input for licenses that changes in our data, so we included the log of its growth
rate. The R2 is 0.17 and both patent applications and TTO staff are negatively related
to licensing TFP and are significant (t-ratios are smaller than -3.9). The disclosure TFP
growth index is not significantly related to licensing TFP growth (t-ratio =-0.1).The patent
and TTO elasticities are -0.375 and -0.531, respectively. The negative patent elasticity is
consistent with our interpretation of declining productivity of the marginal invention. While
the negative TTO elasticity may seem to be an anomaly, it actually provides an additional
explanation for falling TFP in stage three. Rapidly expanding TTOs may exhibit lower
TFP because there is a steep learning curve for new hires (they may be unfamiliar with
faculty and industrial networks important for finding licensees, etc.) so that new staff are,
on average, less productive which implies negative effects on TFP.
4.3. Efficiency Growth and Technical Change
To what extent can we say that best practice has changed over this period, and to
what extent has TFP growth reflected inefficient universities catching up to the frontier?
Returning to Table 1, we again find our results differ markedly across stages. Only for
the patent stage do we find both a shift in the best practice frontier and a movement,
on average, of universities closer to the frontier. The latter result implies universities are
becoming more similar in their patenting propensity. This increasing efficiency is modest
over the four years as average efficiency rises from 0.462 in 1994 to 0.491 in 1997.
The 2.6% growth in TFP for disclosures appears to come primarily from universities
moving closer to the frontier, with a slight inward shift of the frontier. As with patents,
we interpret the efficiency growth as indicating universities becoming more similar in their
disclosure behavior. Average efficiency rises from 0.498 in 1994 to 0.587 in 1994. In contrast,
the decomposition of licensing TFP into efficiency and technical change suggests that there
is increasing diversity in the success rate of universities in turning patents and disclosures
into licenses. On average, there is growth in the frontier, but there is increasing inefficiency
among universities with average efficiency falling from 0.591 in 1994 to 0.439 in 1997
4.4. University Characteristics and TFP
Thursby and Kemp (1999) find significant differences in the commercial activities of
public versus private universities and universities with and without medical schools. With
that in mind, we ask whether there are discernible differences between total factor produc-
tivity in these subsets of universities? We disaggregate the results in Table 1 based on a
public/private and with/without medical school split. Results are in Table 2. We again
find rapid TFP growth in patent applications and falling TFP in licensing for each subset.
TFP observations which follows from DEA calculations which arebasedon the comparisons of a university's
outcomes with that of other universities.13
Private universities appear to have had the greatest growth in TFP for the first two stages.
We find negative TFP growth in the disclosure stage for public universities and universities
without a medical school. The suggestion is that changes in faculty propensity have occurred
primarily at private universities and universities with medical schools. Note the substantial
difference in central administration propensities between private and public schools. Note
also, in the last row of Table 2, that private universities also had a higher growth rate than
the publics for TTO personnel, and universities with medical schools had the highest TTO
growth rates. These latter results may stem from different objectives and/or budgetary
constraints for the private universities and universities with medical schools; this does not,
however, translate into greater TFP growth in licenses executed.
Table 2. Mean TFP Growth Rates by University Characteristic, 1994-97
Private Public Medical No Medical
Universities Universities School School
Invention Disclosures 1.075 0.999 1.071 0.956
Patent Applications 1.196 1.108 1.144 1.131
Licenses Executed 0.967 0.986 0.982 0.974
TTO Growth Ratesa 1.038 1.019 1.049 0.975
aNominal Growth
4.5. Feedback Effects
In modeling the stages involved in licensing we have allowed early stage outputs to affect
productivity in later stages, but we have not allowed for success in later stages to affect early
stage activity. It is natural, however, to expect faculty to disclose inventions only if they
believe their TTO can successfully license them. We also know from our earlier university
survey that TTOs tend to apply for patents only when the likelihood of finding a licensee
is high. Thus, past success in licensing may well affect the propensity of faculty to disclose
and the propensity of the TTO to patent. In this section, we consider such feedback effects.
One way to incorporate feedback effects would be to include financial rewards from
licenses executed as inputs in the first two stages. The problem with this is the same
problem (discussed above) with using financial returns to licenses in measuring TFP in
the third stage. That is, financial returns to licenses executed can appear either as royalty
income or as sponsored research money directed to the inventor's lab. In our interviews with
TTO professionals we were told that some universities actively seek sponsored research at
the expense of royalty income so that information on royalty income, for many universities,14
is an incomplete measure of financial rewards.1° In addition, royalty income in any given
year can be attached to licenses executed in the distant past and current licenses might not
result in income for a number of years.
As alternatives, we consider both the number of licenses and the ratio of licenses to
disclosures in the recent past as inputs to the disclosure decision. One can think of licenses
executed as a "demonstration" that the disclosure process has value, either because of po-
tential royalty revenue and/or sponsored research or simply as an indication that companies
value their work. In our earlier survey, several TTO personnel claimed that some faculty
treat the very fact that a license is signed as a non-pecuniary gain, attaching value to the
fact that their discoveries have commercial appeal. The ratio of licenses to disclosures is
a measure of the success rate of the TTO and should also serve to encourage faculty to
disclose. The measures we use are (i) the average number of licenses executed over the
preceding three years and (ii) the ratio of the three year average of licenses to the three
year average of disclosures.
Including both measures of this demonstration effect produces a marked change in the
first stage results. Rather than TFP growth of 2.6%, the growth is a negligible 0.8%. In
decomposing this growth into technical change and efficiency change we find that there has
been negative growth in technical change (-5.9% per year) and positive growth in efficiency
(7.1% per year). If we drop the ratio of licenses to disclosures, the results remain virtually
identical. If, however, we drop the average number of licenses and retain the ratio, the
results are virtually the same as our results without feedback effects. The implication of
this is that the growth in faculty propensity to disclose is clearly linked to licensing success
as measured by the number of licenses executed in the recent past.
Finally, including these two measures of past licensing success as feedback effects in
the patent stage has little effect on the propensity of university central administrations to
patent. TFP growth falls from 1.139 to 1.115, and we continue to find substantial TFP
growth in both efficiency and technical change.
5. Industry Survey
The picture that emerges from our analysis of the AUTM data is that, while the so-called
commercial outputs from university research have grown substantially, this growth reflects
increased TFP only in the first two stages. We find negative TFP growth in stage three,
which we believe is indicative of the declining commercial appeal of license disclosures and
patent applications at the margin. While this highlights the role of university inputs in
increased commercial activity, the productivity analysis provides limited information about
'0For more on this issue, see Thursby and Kemp (1999). It should also be noted that the tax treatments
of a firm's royalty expenses and a firm's sponsored research expenses are different; the former is a deduction
while the latter can be a credit. Thus, firms are not indifferent across the two methods of payment for a
license.15
the sources of TFP growth, and it does not provide any evidence on the role of business
behavior in the process. That is, we cannot tell the extent to which growth in university
licensing activity was due to a shift in faculty research toward topics with more commercial
appeal, an increase in university attempts to market inventions, or to an increase in demand
for university contracts because of changes in industry R&D.
To examine these issues we conducted a survey of businesses that transfer in technologies
via license or research agreements. The questionnaire was designed to be answered by indi-
viduals actively engaged in executing such agreements and focused on the extent to which
they had executed licenses, options, and/or sponsored research agreements with universi-
ties between 1993-1997. We received responses from 112 business units that had licensed-in
university inventions. As described in Appendix C, firms in our sample accounted for at
least 15% of the license agreements and 17% of sponsored research agreements reported by
AUTM in 1997. Seventy-nine firms in the sample responded to a question on the top five
universities with whom they had contractual agreements. The 85 universities mentioned
include 35 of the top 50 universities in terms of industry sponsored research and 40 of the
top 50 licensing universities in the 1997 AUTM Survey.
We asked respondents about changes in their relationship with universities, as well as
the reasons for any change. In particular, we asked whether their contractual agreements
(license, option and/or research agreements) with universities had increased, decreased or
stayed about the same over the preceding 5 year period. Of the 106 answering this ques-
tion, 50% indicated an increase and 16% indicated a decrease. For those with an increase
or decrease in arrangements we asked, on a 5 point scale with 1 indicating "Extremely im-
portant" and 5 indicating "Not important" (a "Don't know" response was permitted), how
important a set of factors were in explaining the change. Since there are so few respondents
(17) indicating a decrease, we will not consider their reasons for the decrease.
It is worth noting the magnitude of the changes reported. For those noting an increase
in agreements, the number of licenses increased by 86% in 1997 compared to the average of
the preceding 4 years, and their research funding to universities doubled. On average, each
of these firms executed 13 licenses per year and provided $13.2Mil in sponsored research
with U.S. universities.11
Table 3 gives the relative frequency of responses regarding the reasons for the increase
in their contracts. Table 4 gives unweighted and weighted average responses where the
weights are the number of licenses executed with universities over the period 1993-97. The
weighted averages are based on the 35 respondents who provided sufficient information to
calculate the number of licenses —these35 respondents represent 409 university licenses
over this period. The first three questions in Tables 3 and 4 relate to changes in universities
"Those who report decreased contracts indicated levels and changes in levels that are of the same order
of magnitude as those who increased contracts.16
while the last two relate to changes in corporate R&D
Consider the two questions related to a business unit's research: "A change in our unit's
reliance on external R&D"12 and "A change in the amount of basic research conducted
by our unit." Approximately 60% and 41% indicated either a 1 or a 2 for Q4 (change
in reliance) and for Q5 (change in basic research), respectively, suggesting that business
demand for university technologies increased as a result of changes in industry R&D. This,
of course, does not rule out the possibility (discussed below) that industry R&D changed
in response to university characteristics.
The first three questions in Tables 3 and 4 relate to university characteristics: "Cost
of university research," "Faculty research is more oriented toward the needs of business,"
and "A change in universities' receptivity to licensing and/or research agreements." What
stands out is the greater importance attached to university receptivity than either costs
or faculty research orientation; three times as many respondents recorded a 1 (extremely
important) for university receptivity as recorded a 1 for costs or for faculty research.
We tested for significant differences in responses to the 5 questions. The tests are pair-
wise tests for equivalence of the 6-category multinomial distributions. Our tests suggest
a difference significant at the 5% level between responses to Qi (cost) and Q3 (university
receptivity) and to Qi and Q4 (reliance on external R&D). Responses to Q2 (faculty ori-
entation) are also significantly different at the 10% level from those to Q3 and Q4. No
other distributions of responses are significantly different. These tests further support the
importance of changes in industry R&D and in university receptivity to contracts relative
to costs and changes in faculty orientation.
'2Note that a change in a firm's reliance on external RAD does not necessarily reflect a change in their
reliance on universities as only 47% of the licenses executed in 1997 by the firms in our sample are with
U.S. universities.17
Table 3. Relative Frequencies of Reasons behind INCREASING Contracts
Extremely Not Don't
important2 3 4important know
Qi Cost of university research 10.418.8 29.2 10.4 27.1 4.2
Q2 Faculty research is more oriented
toward the needs of business 10.220.4 26.5 18.4 20.4 4.2
Q3 A change in universities'
receptivity to licensing
and/or research agreements 30.6 26.5 20.410.2 12.2 0.0
Q4 A change in our unit's reliance
on external R&D 22.436.7 10.214.3 16.3 0.0
Q5 A change in the amount of basic
research conducted by our unit 18.4 22.4 20.414.3 24.5 0.0
Table 4. Average Responses of Reasons behind INCREASING Contracts
Unweighted Weighted
Qi Cost of university research 3.22 3.98
Q2 Faculty research is more oriented
toward the needs of business 3.57 3.79
Q3 A change in universities'
receptivity to licensing
and/or research agreements 2.42 2.88
Q4 A change in our unit's reliance
on external R&D 2.65 2.54
Q5 A change in the amount of basic
research conducted by our unit 3.04 3.35
We also calculated simple correlations of the individual responses to the 5 questions.
Not surprisingly, the correlation between Q4 and Q5, the questions related to changes in
industry R&D, is fairly high (0.6, significant at the 1% level). To examine whether changes
in industrial R&D might be related to university characteristics, we consider the correla-
tions between responses to the R&D questions and responses to the other three questions.
Responses to the cost question (Qi) have correlations of 0.49 (significant at 1% level) and
0.45 (significant at 5% level) to questions Q4 and Q5, respectively. Neither Q2 (faculty18
orientation) or Q3 (university receptivity) is significantly correlated with the R&D ques-
tions. Thus, while the cost of university research is less important to overall increases
in industry/university contracts than changes in university receptivity to such contracts,
university cost is an important reason behind changes in industry R&D. Finally, the correla-
tion between Q2 and Q3 is 0.61 (significant at the 1% level) implying that, while university
receptivity to contracts is more important than faculty orientation in explaining changes
in industry/university contacts, changes in faculty orientation and changes in university
receptivity to industry contracts go, to some extent, hand in hand.
What do these results tell us about PROP and PROP, the propensities of faculty
and central administrations to commercialize inventions? First, our earlier finding of sub-
stantial TFP growth in patent applications indicated a substantial change in PROP, and
the survey results corroborate this as an important source of the growth in commercial ac-
tivities of universities. Second, we earlier noted that PROP could change either through
a reorientation of faculty research towards the needs of business or through a change in the
willingness of faculty to disclose. The industry survey suggests that, while there may have
been some reorientation of faculty research, a reorientation is much less important than
changes in university receptivity and in industry R&D.
Finally, while we are not able through either the productivity study or the survey to
disentangle the relative importance to the third stage (licenses executed) of changes in
TTO ability and knowledge (PROP) from market conditions (11), it would appear that
industry demand for university technologies has increased, at least in part, due to changes
in industry R&D. The latter changes are related to the cost of university research rather
than a reorientation of faculty or a change in university receptivity to industry contracts.
6. Conclusion
We began this paper with observations on substantial growth in disclosures, new patent
applications and licenses executed. This increased activity has prompted policy makers
in government and academic circles to question the implications for faculty research, and,
in particular, whether faculty research has become more applied in response to license
opportunities. This has been discussed in recent Congressional hearings as an "unintended"
effect of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. The Act was intended, not to redirect faculty research,
but to facilitate industrial application of university research by expanding university rights
to patent and license inventions from federally funded research. To the extent that increased
licensing reflects a greater willingness of faculty and university administrators to facilitate
technology transfer, the surge in licensing reflects the intended effect of the legislation.
While our analysis is intended primarily to examine the sources of the dramatic growth in
licensing activity, it also contributes to the policy debate.
In particular, we find modest TFP growth in disclosures (2.6% annual growth), which19
could reflect changes in faculty research or simply an increased propensity to license as
well as publish their work. While our productivity analysis does not allow us to separate
the two, our industry survey suggests that the modest growth in TFP of disclosures comes
primarily from an increased willingness of faculty to disclose. In indicating the reasons
for their increased interest in university inventions, survey respondents weighted changes
in their own reliance on external R&D and increased university receptivity to industrial
contracts more heavily than the orientation of faculty research toward business needs. It
is worth noting that, while our evidence does not rule out some shift in faculty focus, it is
consistent with statistics on the split between basic and applied research in U.S. universities
as reported by universities to the National Science Foundation (Science and Engineering
Indicators). The average proportion of basic research to total research expenditures for
1977-80 is 0.67 while for 1994-97 it is only 0.005 smaller. This difference represents about
$1 l9mil of the more than $24bi1 of research expenditures at all U.S. universities.
By far, the greatest growth in commercial activity is in the second stage, patent ap-
plications. Patent applications could have grown because of an increase in the propensity
for university administrators to commercialize faculty inventions, but they could also have
grown because of the increase in disclosures. While disclosures have increased, our pro-
ductivity analysis and industry survey also support the first explanation. That is, after
accounting for input growth, patent applications have grown substantially (annual TFP
growth of 13.9%), and this growth is attributed to increasingly entrepreneurial university
administrators. Respondents to our industry survey corroborate this result by placing a
relatively high weight on a change in university receptivity to industrial contracts as being
important in the growth of their university contracts. Here, again, our finding is consistent
with intended effects of the Bayh-Dole Act.
Perhaps the most surprising result is the negative total TFP growth of licenses executed
(-2.1% annual growth). That is, growth in disclosures and patent applications has been
greater then the corresponding growth in licenses executed. We interpret this to mean that
the marginal university innovation offered to the market has declined in commercial appeal;
universities are apparently delving more deeply into the available pool of innovations in
their efforts to increase their commercial activities. Again, delving deeply into the available
pool of innovations is consistent with the intent of the Bayh-Dole Act.
Finally, we do not have evidence on the importance of learning by doing on the part of
TTOs except to note our finding of a negative association between TTO growth and TFP
growth in licensing which would suggest at least the possibility of learning by doing effects.20
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Appendix A: DEA andTFPComputation
Let there be u =1,...,Uuniversities using n =1,...,Ninputs x in stage s to produce
stage output y in period t =1,...,T.The position of university u' relative to the frontier
in stage s (where we suppress the stage notation) is determined by the solution to the
programming problem:
Du'i(xu'i, yui)_1 =MaxO' (6.1)
0uui < (6.2)
z,ixu,i n =1,...,N (6.3)
zu,i ￿ 0 u =1,...,U. (6.4)
The inverse of Ou'is a measure of the distance of u' from the frontier. If l/O? =1then u' lies
on the frontier; otherwise, u' lies interior to the frontier and l/O? represents the fraction of
possible output produced by u'. The best practice frontier (that is, the frontier determined
by the subset of efficient universities) is given by equations 6.2 —6.3for 0 =1.13
To examine changes in university performance over time, we compute Fare et al.'s (1994)
measure of total factor productivity growth (TFP) for each stage. This measure is the
geometric mean of two Malmquist indexes, one of which is based on the best practice
frontier in period t and the other based on the frontier in t + 1, and is given by
m(xu'i+1, yu,i+1 xU',i yU'i) = (6.5)
(Du'i (XU'i+1, yu'i+1)'\ (Du'i+l (XU'i+1, yu'i+1)
1/2
Du'i(xu'i, yu'i) )Du'i+l(xu'i, yu'i) )
whereDu'i(xu'i, yu'i) and Du' ,i+1 (xu'i+1 ,yu'i+l)are given by the solution of 6.1 for k =t
and t+1; that is, they are, respectively, DEA solutions for years t and t+1. Du'i(xu'l, yu'i+1)
is given by the solution to
Du'i(xu'l, yU'i+1)—1 =Max0u' (6.6)
Ou'yu',i+l Zu,iyu,i
zxu,i xu', n =1,...,N
zu,i0
'3For discussions of DEA see Seiford and Thrall (1990), Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford (1994), Au
and Seiford (1993) or Fare,Grosskopfand Lovell (1994).23
and Du', (xu'i, yU'i) is given by the solution to
Du'l(xu'i, yu'i)—1 =MaxO' (6.7)
Ou,yu,,i < zulyul
n =1,...,N
zu,i+1 > 0 u =1,...,U.
Note that equations 6.6 and 6.7 involve observations from both t and t +1. The solution to
6.6 involves period t + 1 inputs and outputs in reference to the period t frontier; it gives the
proportional change in output necessary to make (XU', yu'i+1) feasible given the best-
practice technology at t. The solution to 6.7, on the other hand, uses period t inputs and
outputs in reference to the period t + 1 frontier; it gives the proportional change in output
necessary to make (xu'i, yu'i) feasible given the best-practice technology at t + 1.
We rewrite m(.) by factoring the ratio of Du' 1(xu'i+1, yu'i+1) to Du'i(xu'i, yu'i) from
the right hand side of 6.5 to obtain
/ flu',i+lf u',i+l u',i+l
m(xu',1u',i+lxU',iU',i\ —(iX 68 —
D"(x", yu'i)
( yu'i+1) \ (Du'i(xu'i,yu'i)
1/2
' Du'i+l(xu'i+l, yu'i+1)) Du'i+1(xu'i, yu'i))
This ratio (the first bracketed term in 6.8) is the ratio of the efficiency measure Ou' in
period t to Ou' in period t + 1 and it is the component of productivity change that stems
from movement toward or away from frontiers in periods t and t + 1; it is growth due to
either catching up (the ratio is greater than one) or lagging (the ratio is less than one) of
universities not on the frontier in at least one period. The other term in 6.8 is the component
of productivity change that is due to frontier shifts between t and t + 1. This latter term is
said to represent technical change.
Efficiency results are based on the solution to the programming problem given by equa-
tions 6.1 through 6.4. TFP results are calculated using equation 6.5.24
Appendix B: Data
The AUTM licensing survey (AUTM, various years) has data on the technology transfer
programs of many U.S. universities. In the survey is information on the output of each
of the three stages (numbers of licenses executed, new patent applications and invention
disclosures) as well as the number of full time equivalent staff employed in the TTO and
federal and industry research support. These latter measures are the average level of support
over the preceding three years. For universities that did not respond to all of the first three
years, we use the average support values for the years in which they respond.
Data on faculty size and quality are from the National Research Council's (NRC, 1995)
1993 survey of all Ph.D. granting departments in the U.S. No information is provided for
departments that do not grant the Ph.D. degree. It is plausible to assume that substantial
research programs have difficulty existing in the sciences and engineering -thedepartments
from which 90% of commercial activity originate (see Jensen, Thursby and Thursby, 2000) -
withoutthe presence of Ph.D. students. We accept the reasonable proposition that science
and engineering departments that do not grant the Ph.D. are not strong research depart-
ments and, hence, provide less inventive input to a university's commercial activities; the
AUTM data supports this proposition.
There are 65 universities with information sufficiently complete to compute frontier
production functions and growth rates.25
Appendix C: Survey Design
The sample was drawn from the mailing list of Licensing Executive Society, Inc. (U.S.A.
and Canada). We phoned companies with multiple entries to ensure a single response from
each suitable business unit and to identify the most appropriate respondent. Further calls
allowed us to eliminate businesses that do not license-in technology from any source or
sponsor university research, as well as firms that are no longer in business. This left us with
1385 business units in the sample, and 300 responded (21.7% response rate); 112 indicated
that they had licensed-in university technologies, and 188 indicated that their licenses were
from other sources, though 61 of the latter had sponsored university research.
Many of the companies on the LES list are not publicly traded so it is impossible to con-
duct the usual tests for selectivity bias. We can, however, compare the total of all licenses
and industry sponsored research reported by AUTM to the number of licenses and amount
of sponsored research of our respondents. Of the 112 firms who licensed-in university tech-
nologies, 104 gave information on the number of their license agreements with universities.
These 104 respondents had 417 licenses in 1997, which represents approximately 15% of the
total reported by AUTM.14Seventy-one respondents reported $307Mil of support which is
approximately 17% of the comparable AUTM figure of $1,786Mil for 1997. If the firms with
missing sponsored research expenditures had the same average research expenditure as the
71 usable responses then our 114 respondents account for about 28% of all industry research
support at U.S. universities. Seventy-nine firms listed the primary universities with whom
they licensed during the preceding 5 years and 64 listed the primary universities with whom
they sponsored research.15 Eighty-five universities are mentioned (many are mentioned by a
number of firms) and they cover most of the major U.S. research universities; based on the
1997 AUTM survey, they represent 35 of the top 50 industry supported universities and 40
of the top 50 licensing universities. It is reasonable to conclude that our sample represents
a substantial portion of all industry/university contractual agreements of the recent past.
survey is explicit in differentiating between licenses and options whereas AUTM lumps both to-
gether, thus our estimate and the AUTM figure are not strictly comparable; however, the bulk of university
contracts (aside from research agreements) are licenses. In our survey, licenses outnumbered options by
about 4 to 1.
'5Many who did not answer this question indicated confidentiality concerns. They were reluctant —in
spite of assurances of confidentiality —becauseknowledge of the universities with whom they deal can give
competitors information as to the strategic direction the firm might take in the future.